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Abstract
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics elds such as
game theory, mechanism design and auction theory etc. In this paper, I construct an
example to show that a social choice function which can be implemented in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium is not truthfully implementable. The key point is that agents pay
cost in the indirect mechanism, but pay nothing in the direct mechanism. As a
result, the revelation principle may not hold when agent's cost cannot be neglected
in the indirect mechanism.
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1 Introduction
The revelation principle plays an important role in microeconomics theory
and has been applied to many other elds such as auction theory, game theory
etc. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green (Page 884, Line 24 [1]): \The implication of the revelation principle is ...
to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully implementable."
Related denitions about the revelation principle can be seen in Appendix,
which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D of MWG's textbook[1].
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However, in this paper, I will construct a simple labor model to show that the
revelation principle may not hold when agent's cost cannot be neglected in
the indirect mechanism. Section 2 is the main part of this paper, and Section
3 draws conclusions.
2 Main results
2.1 A labor model
Here we consider a simple labor model which uses some ideas from the rst-
price sealed auction model in Example 23.B.5 [1] and the signaling model in
Section 13.C [1]. There are one rm and two workers. The rm wants to hire
a worker, and two workers compete for this job oer. Worker 1 and Worker
2 dier in the number of units of output they produce if hired by the rm,
which is denoted by productivity type.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two workers are: L and H , where H >
L > 0. Each worker i's productivity i (i = 1; 2) is a random variable chosen
independently, and is private information for each worker.
2) Before confronting the rm, each worker gets some education. The possible
levels of education are: eL and eH , where eH > 0, eL = 0. Each worker's
education is observable to the rm. Education does nothing for a worker's
productivity.
3) The cost of obtaining education level e for a worker of some type  is
given by a function c(e; ) = e=. That is, the cost of education is lower for a
high-productivity worker.
The model's outcome can be represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that worker i gets the job oer with wage w > 0. Recall
that the rm does not know the exact productivity types of two workers, but
its aim is to hire a worker with productivity as high as possible. This aim
can be represented by a social choice function f(~) = (y1(~); y2(~)), in which
~ = (1; 2),
y1(~) =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 > 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 < 2
; y2(~) =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 < 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 > 2
(1)
In order to implement the above f(~), the rm designs an indirect mechanism
  = (S1; S2; g) as follows:
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1) A random move of nature determines the productivity of workers: 1; 2 2
fL; Hg.
2) Conditional on his type i, each worker i = 1; 2 chooses his education level
as a bid bi : fL; Hg ! f0; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of all possible
bids bi(i), and the outcome function g is dened as:
g(b1; b2) = (p1; p2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if b1 > b2
(0:5; 0:5); if b1 = b2
(0; 1); if b1 < b2
(2)
where pi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that worker i gets the oer.
Let u0 be the utility of the rm, and u1; u2 be the utilities of worker 1; 2
respectively, then u0(b1; b2) = p11 + p22   w, and for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(bi; bj; i) =
8>><>>:
w   bi=i; if bi > bj
0:5w   bi=i; if bi = bj
 bi=i; if bi < bj
(3)
The individual rationality (IR) constraints are: ui(bi; bj; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
2.2 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 1: If w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), the social choice function f(~) can
be implemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, workers with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
b1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; b2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (4)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume bj(j) takes this form, i:e:,
bj(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (5)
then consider worker i's problem (i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg, worker i
solves the maximization problem maxbi h(bi; i), where by Eq (3) the object
function is
h(bi; i) = (w bi=i)P (bi > bj(j))+(0:5w bi=i)P (bi = bj(j)) (bi=i)P (bi < bj(j))
(6)
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We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = 0)  (bi=L)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = eH)  (bi=L)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = 0)  (bi=H)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = eH)  (bi=H)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
the strategy bi (i) of worker i
bi (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (7)
4
is the optimal response to the strategy bj(j) of worker j (j 6= i) given in Eq (5).
Therefore, the strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by  .
Now let us investigate whether the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises the
individual rationality (IR) constraints. Following Eq (3) and Eq (7), the (IR)
constraints are changed into: 0:5w bH=H > 0. Obviously, w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L)
satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), then by Eq(2) and Eq(7), for any
~ = (1; 2), where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(b1(1); b

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (8)
which is just the social choice function f(~) given in Eq (1). Q.E.D.
2.3 f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Before we discuss the truthful implementation problem, let us rst cite the
basic idea behind the revelation principle given in MWG's textbook (Page 884,
Line 16, [1]): \If in mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), each agent nds that,
when his type is i, choosing s

i (i) is his best response to the other agents'
strategies, then if we introduce a mediator who says `Tell me your type, i, and
I will play si (i) for you', each agent will nd truth telling to be an optimal
strategy given that all other agents tell the truth. That is, truth telling will
be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this direct revelation game".
Although this basic idea looks reasonable, there indeed exists an assumption
behind the mediator's announcement \I will play si (i) for you." The under-
lying assumption is the following cost condition:
Cost condition: when the mediator plays si (i) for each agent i, he also pays
the cost which would be spent by agent i himself when carrying out the strat-
egy si (i) in the original mechanism  .
Obviously, only when the cost condition holds will the mediator's announce-
ment be credible to the agents. Otherwise none of agents will believe that the
mediator can play si (i) for him, which means no agent will attend the direct
revelation game. Let us take a look at the proof of revelation principle given
in Appendix Proposition 23.D.1. In Eq (23.D.3), agents pay costs by them-
selves when playing strategies si (i) (i = 1;    ; I) in the original mechanism
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 . As a comparison, in Eq (23.D.4), the direct mechanism works. As specied
in Denition 23.B.5, now the strategy set of each agent i is just the same as
his type set, Si = i. At this time, all things that each agent has to do are
to simply announce a type, and each agent does not need to pay any cost by
himself.
However, the cost condition is indeed a paradox. On one hand, as we have seen
above, the cost condition is the cornerstone for the direct revelation mecha-
nism to start up. On the other hand, it is just the cost condition itself that
makes a Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully
implementable. I will prove the latter through Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: The social choice function f(~) given in Eq (1) is not truth-
fully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  direct = (1;2; f(~)), in
which 1 = 2 = fL; Hg, ~ 2 1  2. The timing steps of  direct are as
follows:
1) A random move of nature determines the productivity types of workers:
i 2 i (i = 1; 2), and each worker i announces a type ^i 2 i to a mediator.
Here ^i may not be his true type i.
2) The mediator plays the strategy bi (^i) (i = 1; 2) for each agent i, and
submits the bids to the rm:
bi (^i) =
8<:eH ; if ^i = H0; if ^i = L
3) The rm performs the outcome function g(b1; b2), and hires the winner.
As we have discussed, according to the cost condition, each worker i does not
need to pay the cost bi=i by himself when playing in the direct mechanism.
Hence, the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2 is changed from Eq (3) to
the follows:
ui(^i; ^j; i) =
8>><>>:
w; if ^i > ^j
0:5w; if ^i = ^j
0; if ^i < ^j
; i 6= j (9)
The utility matrix of worker i and j can be expressed as follows.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L [0:5w; 0:5w] [0; w]
H [w; 0] [0:5w; 0:5w]
Obviously, the dominant strategy for each worker i is to denitely announce
^i = H , no matter what his true productivity type i is. The unique outcome
of  direct is that each worker has the same probability 0.5 to get the job oer.
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Thus, the unique equilibrium in the direct revelation mechanism  direct is the
dominant Nash equilibrium (^i; ^j) = (H ; H). Consequently, the social choice
function f(~) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
3 Conclusions
From Section 2, it can be seen that:
1) In the indirect mechanism  , the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2
is given by Eq (3). The cost bi=i is the key item that makes the separating
strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, when the wage
w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L). Thus, the social choice function f can be implemented
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) In Section 2.3, I point out that the cost condition is underlied in the tra-
ditional explanation of revelation principle. Following the cost condition, the
utility function of each worker i is represented by Eq (9). According to the u-
tility matrix of workers, the unique equilibrium of the game induced by  direct
is the dominant Nash equilibrium (^i; ^j) = (H ; H). Hence, the social choice
function f cannot be truthfully implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In summary, the revelation principle may not hold when agent's cost cannot
be neglected in the indirect mechanism.
Appendix: Denitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Each agent i pri-
vately observes his type i that determines his preferences. The set of possible
types of agent i is denoted as i. The agent i's utility function over the out-
comes in set X given his type i is ui(x; i), where x 2 X.
Denition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : 1  I !
X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types (1;    ; I), assigns a
collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
Denition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = i for all i and g() = f() for all  2 1     I .
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Denition 23.D.1: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3: The social choice function f() is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if si (i) = i (for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I) is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism   = (1;    ;I ; f()).
That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
Proposition 23.D.1: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that im-
plements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji](23:D:2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji](23:D:3)
for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji](23:D:4)
for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f()
to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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